Dilemma of Disparity: Appyling the Federal Setencing Guidelines to Downward Departures Based on HIV Infection by MacGillis, James C.




Dilemma of Disparity: Appyling the Federal
Setencing Guidelines to Downward Departures
Based on HIV Infection
James C. MacGillis
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
MacGillis, James C., "Dilemma of Disparity: Appyling the Federal Setencing Guidelines to Downward Departures Based on HIV
Infection" (1996). Minnesota Law Review. 1575.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1575
Note
The Dilemma of Disparity: Applying the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to Downward Departures
Based on HIV Infection
James C. MacGillis*
Thomas Daniel DePew, a criminal defendant infected with
the human inmunodeficiency virus (HIV),' had the accompa-
nying signs of a more advanced stage of the disease.2 After his
* J.D., M.A. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota; B.A. 1992, John
Carroll University.
1. Doctors identify the HIV infection by isolating the virus or by isolat-
ing the presence of antibody to the virus. Dennis H. Osmond, Classification
and Staging of HIV Disease, in AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.1, 1.1-9 (P.T. Cohen
et al. eds., 1994).
2. United States v. DePew, 751 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1990), affd
on other grounds, 932 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 873 (1991).
The court noted that DePew had 'tested positive for the AIDS HIV virus and[was] already in need of treatment and medication for this condition." Id.
The progressed state of HIV infection leads to a designation of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, commonly referred to as "AIDS." According to
the Center for Disease Control's 1993 revision, a person has AIDS if. (1) the
CD4 lymphocyte count is less than 200 cells per cubic millimeter; or (2) one of
a variety of clinical conditions is diagnosed. Osmond, supra note 1, at 1.1-4.
The CD4 lymphocyte cells "perform the extremely important function of initi-
ating or stimulating immune system activities." Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald
H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS LAW TODAY 18, 23(Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1993). The HIV virus reproduces inside the CD4
cell, eventually destroying it. Id. at 22. Destruction of the CD4 cell weakens
the human body's ability to repel infection. Id. at 23. Consequently, infection
with viruses, fungi, bacteria, or parasites are often the "immediate cause of
death in the patient who has AIDS, even though the underlying cause of the
disease is the immune deficiency." AIDS AND THE LAW 467 (David W. Webber
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992).
"AIDS" refers to a "specific group of diseases or conditions that indicate
severe immunosuppression related to infection with the human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV)." Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease/ADS: Medical Back-
ground, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra, at 1. Individuals infected with HIV de-
velop a spectrum of disease-states, ranging from the asymptomatic carrier
stage to fifll-blown AIDS. Id. at 4. The Center for Disease Control has estab-
lished four categories of HIV-infected patients:
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conviction in federal court, he moved for a downward sentence
departure on the grounds that his HIV status constituted an
"extraordinary physical impairment."3 The district court re-
jected his motion.4 The court concluded that neither HIV in-
fection nor other life threatening conditions were a basis for
departure, and therefore ruled that it did not have the discre-
tion to give DePew a lesser sentence. 5
The district court in United States v. DePew looked to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) for direction
in evaluating DePew's motion for departure.6 The Guidelines
mandate a sentence range within which courts must sentence
an offender, but allow courts to depart from the range in cer-
tain circumstances. The Guidelines do not explicitly permit
district courts to consider HIV status in determining the length
Group I: Patients with transient signs and symptoms that appear at
the time of, or shortly after, initial infection with HIV as identified by
laboratory studies. These patients have a mononucleosis-like syn-
drome, with or without aseptic meningitis, associated with serocon-
version for HIV antibody. All patients in Group I should be reclassi-
fied in another group after resolution of this acute syndrome.
Group II: Patients who have no signs or symptoms of HIV infection:
[referred to as] asymptomatic HIV disease.
Group III: Patients with persistent generalized lymphadenopathy,
defined as palpable lymphadenopathy (lymph node enlargement of
one centimeter or greater) at two or more extrainguinal sites (outside
the groin or lower abdomen) persisting for more than three months in
the absence of a concurrent illness or condition other than HIV infec-
tion to explain the findings.
Group IV: Patients with clinical symptoms and signs of HIV infection
other than or in addition to lymphadenopathy. Patients in this group
are assigned to one or more subgroups based on clinical findings.
Id. at 6-7.
3. DePew, 751 F. Supp. at 1199.
4. Id.
5. Id. The court noted, "Except in extraordinary circumstances not pre-
sent here, terminally ill persons who commit serious crimes may not use their
affliction to escape prison. Were this rule otherwise, the law's deterrent effect
would be unreasonably and unnecessarily diminished in the case of terminally
ill persons." Id. The DePew court's language would eventually be used in
other cases restricting the applicability of downward departures. See United
States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting downward de-
parture where at the time of sentencing, the defendant had not developed
AIDS and was still in relatively good health); United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d
1257, 1275-76 (7th Cir.) (rejecting downward departure based on AIDS where
defendant failed to request a departure according to the provisions of the sen-
tencing guidelines), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 234 (1995); United States v. Rab-
ins, 63 F.3d 721, 727-29 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting downward departure where
defendant's AIDS condition did not present an extraordinary physical im-
pairment at the time of sentencing).
6. DePew, 751 F. Supp. at 1199.
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of an offender's sentence. The Guidelines do, however, permit
a court to consider an offender's physical condition if the con-
dition constitutes an "extraordinary physical impairment."7
While the Guidelines leave "extraordinary physical impair-
ment" undefined, they do provide that the condition of a
"seriously infirm defendant" could warrant departure. 8
The expansive scope and continued spread of HIV infec-
tion, combined with its progressed form, Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS),9 have affected most facets of the
criminal justice system, including sentencing under the Guide-
lines. 10 Federal district courts, however, are not uniformly
prepared to deal with the issue. Some courts considering
downward departures based on HIV status are well informed
about the disease, I' while other courts' ignorance has surfaced
in misuse of HIV terminology. 2 Some district courts have
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELImES MANUAL [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] § 5H1.4,
p.s. (Nov. 1994).
8. Id.
9. The Center for Disease Control recorded the 500,000 mark for AIDS
cases in October of 1995. First 500,000 Cases, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 849, 849 (1995). The period from 1981 through 1987 claimed 10%
of all known cases; the period from 1988 through 1992 claimed 41%; and the
period from 1993 through October 1995 claimed 49%. Id. The rate of AIDS
cases continues to increase at a slightly faster rate in United States prisons
and jails than in the population at large. Study Finds AIDS Growing but Not
Rampant Among U.S. Prisons, AIDS ALERT, Apr. 1994, at 57, available in
WESTLAW, Health Law Library, HWD File.
10. The presence of HIV infection and AIDS in correctional facilities has
produced significant litigation on issues ranging from confidentiality for in-
mates to segregation and adequacy of medical care. See THEODORE M.
HAMMETT ET AL., 1992 UPDATE: HIV/AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 79-
83 (1994). At the state level, a court extended the sentence of a prisoner for
attempting to transmit HIV to a guard. See New Jersey v. Smith, 621 A.2d
493, 496-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (upholding the 25-year sentence
for an HIV-infected inmate who bit guard's hand and allegedly said, "Now die,
you pig! Die from what I have!"). See generally AIDS AND THE LAW, supra
note 2, at §§ 9.1-9.6 (discussing the housing of AIDS prisoners, testing for the
HIV virus in prisons, and the liability of prison officials).
11. See United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 738-44 (8th Cir. 1995)
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (discussing the medical condition of the offender, the
current HIV classification system, the life expectancy of persons with AIDS,
and the differences between AIDS and other serious illnesses), cert. denied,
Johnson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1031 (1996).
12. See United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating
that a downward departure would only be possible where an offender's condi-
tion was "advanced AIDS"). The court inappropriately used the term "ad-
vanced AIDS," because AIDS itself is a clinical designation for an advanced
progression of the HIV infection. The court probably meant "advanced HIV"
or "advanced HIV disease," terms that would properly describe persons late in
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dealt with their lack of knowledge about HIV by pleading for
guidance from higher courts as to how to evaluate HIV in sen-
tencing. 3 The varied approaches courts have taken when ad-
dressing HIV and the continued increase in the number of
HIV-positive offenders 4 suggest that all courts require better
information regarding the nature of HIV infection and its rele-
vance to downward departures.
This Note addresses the application of Guideline sections
5H1.4 and 5K2.0-respectively governing "extraordinary phys-
ical impairments" and "mitigating circumstances"-to down-
ward sentence departures based on HIV infection. Part I con-
siders the formation and structure of the Guidelines and re-
views the general and HIV-specific application of downward
departures under 5H1.4 and 5K2.0. Part II critiques the ap-
proaches courts have taken with regard to HIV infection as a
basis for downward sentencing departures. Part II concludes
that the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines' language
support judicial consideration of downward departures based
on a medical diagnosis of AIDS or advanced HIV. Part III
urges the courts to give particularly acute examination to de-
parture requests based on either AIDS accompanied by physi-
cal deterioration or advanced HIV. This Note proposes that
the Sentencing Commission amend the Guidelines to clarify
that AIDS accompanied by physical deterioration and ad-
vanced HIV is an "extraordinary physical impairment" war-
ranting consideration for downward sentencing departure.
I. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THEIR
APPLICATION
A. FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDELINES
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established a Federal
the AIDS disease process. Letter from Lee Hardy, AIDS Research Informa-
tion Center, to author (Dec. 18, 1995) (on file with Minnesota Law Review).
13. See Rabins, 63 F.3d at 735 (noting the request for guidance on the
downward departure issue by a district court judge who stated, "I wouldn't be
upset if you get me reversed.").
14. See PETER M. BRIEN & CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HIV IN PRISONS AND JAILS, 1993, at 1 (1995). The number of state and federal
inmates reported to be HIV-infected increased by 23% from 1991 to 1993. Id.
at 2. Confirmed AIDS cases in U.S. prisons increased 124% from 1991 to the
end of 1993, from 1,682 to 3,765. Id. Most H1V and AIDS cases occur in state
prisons, though the number of reported HIV-infected inmates in the Federal
Bureau of Prisons increased 52%, to 959, from 1991 to 1993. Id.
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Sentencing Commission (Commission) to develop a mandatory
sentencing system. 5  Congress gave the Commission the
power, subject to congressional review and other federal stat-
utes,' 6 to evaluate past sentencing practices and create defini-
tive and narrower sentence ranges for federal offenses. 17 Prior
15. The original legislation calling for guidelines was the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1994)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)). Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
Act in part due to public concern over increased violent crime, recidivism, and
drug use. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflection on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1945 (1988). See gen-
erally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Com-
promises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (discussing back-
ground and principles behind the Guidelines).
The United States Sentencing Commission took three years to develop
the Guidelines, with the participation of judges, attorneys, and academics
seeking to standardize the sentencing process in the federal court system. Id.
at 5-6. The Commission's establishment by Congress responded to judicial
and legislative concern about the variety of sentences received by offenders
who had committed the same or similar crimes. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235; see also United States v.
Draper, 888 F.2d 1100, 1104 (6th Cir. 1989) ("The primary goal of the Act was
to eradicate what Congress felt to be gross and unjustified disparity in sen-
tencing across the nation, and to foster uniformity."); Judge Edward Becker,
Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings,
101 YALE L.J. 2053, 2053 (1992) ("The impetus behind the creation of the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines arose from widespread concern about increased
crime, the perception that tougher sentences would decrease crime, and the
recognition of widespread disparity in sentencing."). According to the intro-
duction of the 1994 Annual Report, the Guidelines intend:
[T]o provide certainty and fairness in meeting these purposes by
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity among offenders with
similar characteristics convicted of similar criminal conduct while
permitting sufficient judicial flexibility to account for relevant aggra-
vating and mitigating factors ....
U.S. SENTENCING COMMIN, ANN. REP. xv (1994) [hereinafter COMM'N REP.].
16. The Commission has always created the Guidelines and then submit-
ted them to Congress for review. If Congress fails to act on the Guidelines
within 180 days, then the Guidelines are automatically accepted and become
binding on federal courts. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, Pt.A, intro. cmt. 2. In
1994, six new amendments were submitted to Congress and became effective
after Congress failed to act on them. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 5.
17. The decision to enact a sentencing procedure whereby courts sentence
based on the key offense while also considering some actions taken by the of-
fender during the crime resulted in a modified "charge offense" system.
U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch1., Pt.A, intro. cmt. 4(a). A pure "real offense" sys-
tem would "base sentences upon the actual conduct in which the defendant
engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted." Id.
The Commission's decision was generally well received. See, e.g., Bruce M.
Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurispru-
dence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10
1996] 233
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to the Guidelines, a judge could sentence anywhere within a
broad statutory range.' 8 When Congress approved the Guide-
lines,19 it replaced the wide latitude federal judges previously
enjoyed 2° with a purposefully limited opportunity to depart
from the Guidelines' sentence range.21
Under the Guidelines, courts now have a more adminis-
(1991) ("This hybrid approach is both workable and equitable. Because our
system ofjustice must combat the vicissitudes and innovations of criminal en-
terprise, courts must be able to depart from the Guidelines in the face of ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstances."). But see Gerald W. Heaney, The Re-
ality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 161,
227-30 (1991) (critiquing the modified model adopted by the Commission and
proposing, by contrast, an "offense-of-conviction" model, which would consider
only conduct formally proven at trial or admitted to by the defendant as a ba-
sis for sentencing).
18. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681,
1687-88 (1992).
19. The Guidelines became law on November 1, 1987, after congressional
review and adoption. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, PtA, intro. cmt. 2.
20. The discretion given judges led to disparities in sentences for similar
crimes committed by different offenders and for offenders committing similar
crimes in different regions. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41-45, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224-29 (describing the results of two sentencing
studies that found judges specifying wide ranges of sentences for the same
crime). The sentences detailed by twenty judges for a hypothetical bank rob-
bery ranged from eighteen years in prison and a $5,000 fine to five years in
prison and no fine. Id. at 42-43; MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 17-23, 118-24 (1972) (providing examples of sentence
disparities and making an early call for sentence reform); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT 4-5 (1976) (discussing studies from the early 1970s that illus-
trate sentence disparity in California, Ohio, and South Carolina); Kevin
Clancy et al., Sentencing Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and
the Extent and Sources of Sentencing Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 524, 553 (1981) (concluding that sentence disparity "is a widespread
phenomenon").
21. Congress and the Commission meant to limit judicial discretion of
courts for downward and upward departures from the guideline sentences.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (directing the court to follow the sentence
range, "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should re-
sult in a sentence different from that described"); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 79,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3262 (noting the rejection of an amend-
ment that would have expanded the opportunities for judges to depart from
the sentencing guidelines); see also Harvey Berkman, Court To Take On Sen-
tencing Rules, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at Al ("Since they were drafted 10
years ago, the federal sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums have
accomplished at least one thing they were supposed to do: reduce judicial dis-
cretion.").
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trative than judicial role. 22 When sentencing, a court first de-
termines an offense point total based on the convicted crime
and characteristics involved in the crime's commission.23 The
point total of the crime then intersects with one of six criminal
history levels, providing the court with a range within which to
sentence the offender.24 The district court may depart upward
or downward from this range only in particular circum-
stances. 25 An appellate court can review the sentence only for
clear errors of law, and not for the district court's discretionary
decision of whether or not to depart from the Guideline range.26
The Guidelines include three types of directives: guide-
22. See Berkman, supra note 21, at Al (detailing the relative inability ofjudges to depart from the sentencing guideline ranges).
23. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, § B1.1. An offender convicted of aggra-
vated assault, for example, would have a base offense level of 15. U.S.S.G.,
supra note 7, § 2A2.2. Discharge of a firearm during the crime would increase
the total offense mark by five levels. Id. If the victim sustained bodily injury,
two to six levels could be added for a total offense level ranging from 22 to 28.
Id.
24. The above example of an aggravated assault with discharge of fire-
arm, minimal bodily injury, and no previous criminal history for the offender
would result in a sentence ranging from 41 to 51 months. U.S.S.G., supra
note 7, Ch.5, PtA. The court must sentence the offender in the designated
sentence range, subject to the exceptions for which the Guidelines provide.
Id.
Within the sentencing range, a court is guided by the need for the sen-
tence imposed:
(A) [To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most ef-
fective manner[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A-D) (1994).
25. The most common basis for downward departure is for the
"substantial assistance" of the defendant. See CoMm'N REP., supra note 15, at
80. In 1994, courts effected a downward departure in 19.5% of all sentencing
cases based on the "substantial assistance" of the defendant. Id. For an
overview of the debate about prosecutorial discretion in dictating who receives
substantial assistance departures, see Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1862-72 (1995).
26. See United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir.
1993) ("We review a district court's factual findings for clear error and will not
reverse unless we are left with the 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.'" (quoting United States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346, 1356
(9th Cir. 1991))).
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lines, policy statements, and commentary.27 Together, they
create and support "heartland"28 sentence ranges that identify
the typical circumstances for many crimes.29 The Commission
considered the major factors affecting district courts' previous
sentencing decisions when it created the sentence range for
each crime.3" Accordingly, the Commission expected that only
a limited number of atypical cases would require judicial de-
partures from the designated sentence ranges.31
27. Guidelines and policy statements provide two different levels of
Commission directive, a distinction that has been lost on some courts. Freed,
supra note 18, at 1732. "Guidelines" set by the Sentencing Reform Act control
sentencing courts when the courts determine the penalty to be imposed in a
criminal case. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1994). Congress has a six-month review
period during which it may reject or modify the Guidelines, or amendments to
the Guidelines, before they take effect. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1994). The Su-
preme Court has equated guidelines with legislative rules adopted by federal
agencies. See Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993).
"Policy statements" are general directives "regarding application of the
guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation...."
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (1994). According to the 1987 Prosecutors Handbook on
Sentencing Guidelines: "policy statements.., only provide general advisory
statements which are not binding," and "[a] court is not required to abide by a
policy statement suggesting a departure from the guidelines even though a
factor is present in the case which is addressed by such a policy statement
and insufficiently addressed by the guidelines themselves." Freed, supra note
18, at 1732 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK ON
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING
REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 7 (1987)) (emphasis omitted).
The Commission issues "commentary" to aid in the explanation of guide-
lines and policy statements. It is "authoritative unless it violates the Consti-
tution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline." Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1915.
28. The "heartland" range is the set of typical cases embodying the con-
duct that each guideline describes. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, Pt.A, intro.
cmt. 4(b). The Commission intended the "heartland" range to cover the vast
majority of situations that formerly would have provided courts with reason to
exercise their departure discretion. Id. Using past sentencing practice data
and anticipating future modifications based on newer data, the Commission
hoped to refine the Guidelines to preserve the general inclusiveness of the
"heartland" range. Id.
29. Id. The Commission expressed its belief that, "despite the courts' le-
gal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often." Id.
30. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994) (legislating that the Commission
should consider the relevance of age, education, vocational skill, mental and
emotional condition, physical condition, previous employment record, com-
munity ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence
upon criminal activity for a livelihood when establishing categories of defen-
dants for use in the Guidelines).
31. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, Pt.A, intro. cmt. 4(b) ("Such rare occur-
rences are precisely the type of events that the courts' departure powers were
236 [Vol. 81:229
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To prevent courts from reconsidering those variables the
Commission took into account when it formulated a sentencing
range, the Guidelines restrict courts from using certain of-
fender characteristics to justify a departure." The Guidelines
state, for example, that characteristics such as age, community
involvement, and physical condition are "not ordinarily rele-
vant"33 to the court's sentence determination. These limits,
however, are subject to other sections of the Guidelines and
conflicting federal statutes, all of which allow the court to con-
sider any relevant characteristic of the offender for sentencing
purposes.34 Taken together, the guidelines, commentary, and
policy statements of the Guidelines, as well as relevant stat-
utes, provide inconsistent directions for the district court
seeking to depart downward.35
B. DOWNWARD DEPARTURES UNDER SECTIONS 5H1.4 AND
5K2.0 OF THE GUIDELINES
Although Congress established the Guidelines to eliminate
designed to cover-unusual cases outside the range of the more typical of-
fenses for which the guidelines were designed.").
32. Id., §§ 5H1.1-5H1.12, p.s.; see also id., Ch-5, Pt.H, intro. cmt. ("nThe
Commission has determined that certain factors are not ordinarily relevant to
the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
guideline range.") (emphasis added). Included is the policy statement that,
"Physical condition... is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range." Id., § 5H1.4, p.s.
33. Id., §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.4, 5H1.6, p.s.
34. Guideline 1B1.4, for instance, directs that:
In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or
whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may
consider, without limitation, any information concerning the back-
ground, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise
prohibited by law.
Id., § 1B1.4.
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1994) mandates:
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the back-
ground, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.
35. Confusion also extends to judges seeking to sentence offenders to a
longer term than the sentencing table directs. See, e.g., United States v.
Harris, 70 F.3d 1001, 1003 (8th Cir. 1995) (reversing upward departure based
on conduct from dismissed counts); United States v. Big Medicine, 73 F.3d
994, 997 (10th Cir. 1995) (vacating upward departure based on age of victim
in sexual abuse); United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1085-87 (9th Cir.)
(reversing upward departure based on offender's criminal history points), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 351 (1995).
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the disparity in sentences among similarly situated offenders, 36
neither Congress nor the Commission foreclosed all judicial
options for distinguishing among unusual circumstances. Sec-
tions 5H1.4 and 5K2.0 of the Guidelines provide a specific in-
stance, and a more general directive, respectively, that allow a
district court to consider certain exceptional, relevant circum-
stances.
37
1. Downward Departures Under Section 5H1.4 for
"Extraordinary Physical Impairment"
Section 5H1.4 (physical condition statement) of the Guide-
lines states that courts should not consider an offender's physi-
cal condition during sentencing. 3' This restriction is subject to
the exception, however, that an "extraordinary physical im-
pairment" may provide justification for a sentence below the
delineated "heartland range."39  The Commission provides as
an example a seriously infirm defendant for whom home de-
tention might be more economical and efficient than prison.4 °
The district court is responsible for determining whether
an offender has an "extraordinary physical impairment." Once
36. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52-53 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235-36 (noting Senate Report language expressing con-
cern over disparity in federal sentences).
37. The effort to contain the courts' discretion extends to a limitation on
the use of offender characteristics for upward departure without legitimate
findings. See, e.g., United States v. Smallwood, 3 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir.
1993) (remanding case for resentencing where district court improperly con-
sidered offender's prior convictions for unrelated offenses); United States v.
Gerra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1061-64 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting district court's sen-
tence of 120 months imprisonment without adequate explanation, where
guideline range was 41-51 months); cf United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d
1298, 1312 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding upward departure from 37 to 60 months
reasonable where offender's conduct of concealing criminal proceeds went far
beyond the "heartland" stage).
38. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, § 5H7.4, p.s. ("Physical condition is not ordi-
narily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
guidelines ....").
39. The pertinent part of the policy statement reads as follows:
Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordinar-
ily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable guideline range. However, an extraordinary physical im-
pairment may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable
guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant,
home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, impris-
onment.
Id., § 5H1.4, p.s.
40. Id.
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a district court finds that an impairment is "extraordinary," it
has broad discretion whether to depart from the sentence
range in that particular case.41 A higher court may only re-
verse the district court's factual finding of an extraordinary
physical impairment if the lower court has committed a "clear
error of law."42 Generally, appellate courts have scrutinized
district courts' downward departures from the Guidelines by
requiring them to explain clearly any extraordinary physical
impairments4 3 and by limiting their attempts to extend the
definition of impairment.'
Courts have found a variety of maladies to constitute an
extraordinary physical impairment. One appellate court af-
41. United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting "a court is
never required to depart downward"); United States v. Gregory, 932 F.2d
1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that district court's refusal to depart
downward was not appealable); United States v. Gant, 902 F.2d 570, 573 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("It would be anomalous to find that we have jurisdiction over the
appeal of a defendant who actually benefited from a downward departure that
he regards as being niggardly.").
42. United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir.
1993). Judge Ferguson's concurring opinion in Martinez-Guerrero details a
two-step analysis for granting downward departures under § 5H1.4. Under
this analysis, the district court initially makes a factual finding about whether
the offender's disabilities constitute an extraordinary physical impairment
under § 5H1.4. If the court concludes the impairment is "extraordinary," it
then determines whether the impairment warrants a departure. The court
can sentence below the Guideline sentence range or even provide an alterna-
tive to imprisonment. Id. (Ferguson, J., concurring); United States v. Saun-
ders, 743 F. Supp. 444, 446-48 (E.D. Va. 1990) (denying downward departure
request on two separate grounds), affd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1199 (1992); see, e.g., United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216,
1218 (9th Cir. 1992) (overturning a factual finding that childhood abuse of the
defendant was not "extraordinary" under § 5H1.3 of the Guidelines).
43. See Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d at 620 (describing the two-step proc-
ess for departure as follows: the district court should first make a factual
finding whether the offender has an "extraordinary physical impairment" and
then consider whether the impairment warrants a modified sentence) (citing
United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 324 (7th Cir. 1990)).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 6 F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1993)(rejecting district court's sentence of a wheelchair-bound quadriplegic to less
than the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment); United
States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990)(rejecting sentencing court's use of female offender's pregnancy status to jus-
tify downward sentence departure); United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 324(7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting departure based on numerous operations for brain
tumor without specific findings that offender "was elderly and infirm and that
an alternative form of confinement would be equally efficient and less costly
than incarceration").
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firmed a departure where several minor physical ills combined
to equal an extraordinary impairment.4 5 Another appellate
court affirmed a downward departure where impairments were
likely to worsen over the course of a sentence.4 6 In one unap-
pealed departure case, a district court found that metastasized
cancer was an extraordinary physical impairment warranting
a departure from the Guideline range.47 The offender in this
case had moved for a departure on the ground that his cancer
was "a serious, life-threatening illness."4 8
Courts have also departed from the Guidelines based on
"extraordinary physical impairment" where the convicted in-
dividual's physical condition might lead to an extraordinarily
harmful experience.49 In United States v. McClean, ° for ex-
45. United States v. Boy, Nos. 93-30100 & 93-30133, 1994 WL 59781, at
*2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1994). The offender had a degenerative hip and knee
condition, nonactive tuberculosis, and Hyperactive Adjustment Disorder. Id.
at *2. The court upheld the departure despite the Presentence Report that
.specifically indicated that [the offender's] medical problems could be ad-
dressed in prison." Id. at *3.
46. United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1277-78 (8th. Cir. 1992)(upholding downward departure where district court concluded that "the im-
position of a term of imprisonment could be the equivalent of a death sentence
for Mr. Long."); see also Susan Chandler, Ailing Cosentino Gets Five Years'
Probation, CHi. SuN-TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1993, at 3 (reporting that a federal dis-
trict court accepted as an "extraordinary physical impairment" an offender's
congestive heart failure and diabetes despite testimony by a prison official
that the system had adequate resources to care for the offender).
47. United States v. Velasquez, 762 F. Supp. 39,40 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
48. Id.
49. United States v. McClean, 822 F. Supp. 961, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
Courts have applied this consideration also where the physical appearance of
a particular offender could lead to out-of-the-ordinary and unusually vicious
treatment by other prisoners. For a frequently cited and critiqued example,
see United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 605 (2d Cir. 1990). In Lara, the court
of appeals upheld a departure granted on the basis that the offender was bi-
sexual, looked 16, and as such was "peculiarly vulnerable" to attack. Id. at
601. The sentencing court judge noted that adhering to the guideline range
would be "nothing less than draconian," resulting in "a sentence which is un-
duly severe relative to most other defendants in this Court who do not have
the vulnerability, the appearance, [and] the sexual orientation that this de-
fendant presents." Id.; see also United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525, 526-
27 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming departure based on extreme vulnerability to
physical abuse arising from "a feminine cast of face").
The Commission challenged the Lara court decision, based on what is of-
ten referred to as the "physical vulnerability" departure, the following year.
Specifically, the Commission substantially limited any future use of the de-
parture by amending its guidelines to state explicitly that "physique" was
among the physical characteristics "not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range."
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ample, the court found that the offender's crippled leg and poor
health would leave him more vulnerable than the average pris-
oner to abuse from other inmates. 1 The court thus reduced his
sentence to account for this potentially harsh treatment. 2
While the Bureau of Prisons has specialty medical centers for
inmates, a court may still consider the Bureau's ability to ac-
commodate an offender in determining whether an offender
has an extraordinary impairment. 3
2. Downward Departure Under Section 5K2.0
Section 5K2.0 is the general departure provision permit-
ting sentence departures in cases where "there exists an ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission."54
This provision holds the court responsible for evaluating the
unusualness of a circumstance and the degree of consideration
U.S.S.G., supra note 7, App. C, amend. 386. Before amendment, the guideline
stated: "Physical condition is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the guidelines or where within the guidelines a
sentence should fall." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.4, policy
statement (Nov. 1989). Both versions of the guidelines, however, allow that
"an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason" to impose a sentence
outside the usual range. Id.; U.S.S.G., supra note 7, § 5H1.4, p.s.
50. 822 F. Supp. 961 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
51. Id. at 962.
52. Id.
53. See United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir.
1993) ("The ability of the Bureau of Prisons to accommodate a disability is
[one] factor which the district court may consider" in making a finding regard-
ing an extraordinary physical impairment.) (citations omitted); see also
United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1278 (8th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that
availability of appropriate facilities is a permissible factor in determining
downward departures).
54. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, § 5K2.0, p.s. The policy statement takes its
language from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b):
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described. In determining whether a circum-
stance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall con-
sider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission. In the absence of an
applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an appropri-
ate sentence, having due regard for the purposes [of sentencing].
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). For a thorough judicial discussion of the § 5K2.0
departure, see United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1305-09 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 961 (1993).
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the Sentencing Commission gave it.5 5 In reviewing mitigating
circumstance departures, appellate courts should examine why
a district court departed and then "consider how such aggra-
vating circumstances are treated in the Manual in order to
determine whether they were 'of a kind, or to a degree' ade-
quately considered by the Commission."56  A mitigating cir-
cumstance departure can complement a physical condition de-
parture, under section 5H1.4, or be used alone as a court's
justification for evaluating a particular characteristic of an of-
fender.57
Courts have found mitigating circumstances to support
both upward and downward sentencing departures .5  In
United States v. Velasquez,59 the district court ruled that the
defendant's cancer was a mitigating circumstance not ade-
quately considered by the Commission, and thus, that it could
be a basis for a downward departure.6 1 In a case with similar
mitigating circumstances, an offender's life-threatening me-
tastic kidney cancer warranted a downward departure.6 1 The
use of the mitigating circumstance departure suggests that
courts are recognizing some offender circumstances that the
Commission did not anticipate, or, alternately, did not consider
"adequately" when it developed the Guidelines.6 2
55. Unless the Commission explicitly commented on a characteristic or
circumstance, there is no way for a court to be certain of the extent to which
the Commission considered a given factor. See Freed, supra note 18, at 1733-
37 (criticizing the Commission for its failure to define "adequate considera-
tion").
56. Merritt, 988 F.2d at 1306 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)).
57. The departures were used together in United States v. Velasquez, 762
F. Supp. 39, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), but are often used separately. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (moving
for departure on grounds of "extraordinary physical impairment"); United
States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1990) (moving for departure on
grounds of mitigating circumstance).
58. See supra note 37 (discussing constraints on upward departures) and
notes 45-49 and accompanying text (noting downward departure examples).
59. 762 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
60. Id. at 40.
61. United States v. Basey, No. 95-1348, 1995 WL 567356, at *1 (8th Cir.
Sept. 12, 1995). The sentencing court reduced the defendant's Guidelines
range penalty of 77 to 96 months imprisonment to 40 months imprisonment
and three years probation. Id. The defendant unsuccessfully appealed this
departure, arguing the district court should have departed to a sentence of
probation. Id.
62. See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text (identifying a failure
to consider "adequately" the circumstance of HIV-positive offenders).
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C. HIV INFECTION AND SENTENCING: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
1. The Scope of the HIV Crisis
The HIV and AIDS63 crisis continues unabated in the
United States; late in 1995, reported AIDS cases reached the
500,000 mark.6 Issues associated with HIV infection and the
development of AIDS have permeated the criminal justice sys-
tem.65 The prison system, in particular, has borne the burden
of balancing additional health,66 safety, and budgetary67 con-
63. See supra note 2 (defining stages of HIV infection and AIDS, and out-
lining the Center for Disease Control classification system).
64. MORBIDITY & MORTALITYWKLY. REP., supra note 9, at 849.
65. A 1994 study combining statistics for local, state, and federal prisons
found that full-blown AIDS among prisoners increased over 66% from October
1990 to March 1993. Randy Martin et al., A Content Assessment and Com-
parative Analysis of Prison-Based AIDS Education Programs for Inmates, 75
PRISON J. 5, 6 (1995). For another indication of HIV infection rates escalating
at crisis levels among the prison population, compare id. at 5, citing a 1990
study setting the ratio of HIV infection among the general and prison popula-
tions at six to one, with Elizabeth Kantor, AIDS and HIV Infection in Prison-
ers, in AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE, supra note 1, at 1.8-1, reporting that AIDS is
14 times more prevalent among state and federal prisoners than it is among
the general population.
Thus far, the number of HIV-related appeals of sentences to the federal
appeals courts does not reflect this disproportionate representation. Two ex-
planations for the limited number of HIV-related appeals appear plausible.
The first and most likely is that the federal courts come into contact with
fewer HIV-infected offenders than do the state courts. Interview with Mi-
chael Tonry, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota, in Minneapolis, Minn.
(Oct. 25, 1995). The types of crimes that are more likely to be committed by
intravenous drug users, a high-risk factor for HIV transmission, are violations
of state criminal law. Id. The high number of HiV-infected prisoners in New
York, which has a significant population of intravenous drug users, supports
this proposition. Kantor, supra, at 1.8-1.
The second possible explanation is that HiV-infected offenders are likely
to be receiving downward departures in other ways, such as by substantial
assistance departures or selective application of criminal counts by Assistant
United States Attorneys. Tonry, supra; see also supra note 24 (discussing
"substantial assistance" departures). The high number of departures in some
circuits corroborate the supposition that the Guidelines are being evaded in
some cases. In the Ninth Circuit's Arizona District, for instance, 36.0% of all
sentences were issued with downward departures for a reason other than sub-
stantial assistance. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 85. When the substantial
assistance departures are included, an additional 14.8% of sentences were
downward departed. Id. At the other extreme, the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia (4th Cir.) granted downward departures in only 6.7% of sentences, with
2.8% of these being for reasons other than substantial assistance. Id. at 83.
66. In New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, and
Florida, for example, AIDS-related deaths comprised about half or more of all
deaths in 1993. See BRIEN & HARLOW, supra note 14, at 6.
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cerns, while also trying to filfill its mission of confining offend-
ers in facilities that are "safe, humane, and appropriately se-
cure."" The sixty-six percent increase in federal, state, and lo-
cal inmates diagnosed with AIDS between 1990 and 199369
strongly suggests that the prison system will continue to
struggle to accommodate HIV-infected prisoners and prisoners
with AIDS.7 0
The nature of the HIV virus complicates its use as a basis
for downward sentencing departures. Because a person can
remain in relatively good health for up to ten years after IlV
infection,7 ' a downward departure based on the virus would
The interaction between persons infected with tuberculosis and persons
infected with HIV, two groups overrepresented in prisons, may prove disas-
trous. See Faith Colangelo & Mariana Hogan, Jails and Prisons-Reservoirs
of TB Disease: Should Defendants with HIV Infection (Who Cannot Swim) Be
Thrown into the Reservoir?, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 467, 467 (1993). The com-
promised immune systems of HIV-infected inmates leave them particularly
vulnerable to tuberculosis outbreaks. Id. at 468 (citing Charles L. Daley, M.D.
et al., An Outbreak of Tuberculosis with Accelerated Progression Among Per-
sons Infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 326 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 231, 231 (1992)); see also Jonathan M. Smith, Spread of TB Poses Dan-
ger to Prisoners and Staff, NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J., Spring 1995, at 2 (noting
the difficulty of testing for tuberculosis where rates of HIV infection are high).
See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in
the Era of AIDS: Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1, 67-70 (1995) (discussing public health ramifications of interaction be-
tween tuberculosis and the HIV virus).
67. The District of Columbia Correction System estimates that it costs
$60,000 per year to care for an inmate with advanced HIV, about 2.5 times
the cost of a healthy inmate. Sara Polonsky et al., HIV Prevention in Prisons
and Jails: Obstacles and Opportunities, 109 PUB. HEALTH REP. 615, 621
(1994); see also Colangello & Hogan, supra note 66, at 468 nn.9-13 and accom-
panying text (recognizing the staggering public health and economic conse-
quences of treating an increasing number of prisoners for tuberculosis); Susan
Lundstrom, Note, Dying to Get Out: A Study on the Necessity, Importance,
and Effectiveness of Prison Early Release Programs for Elderly Inmates Suf-
fering from HIV Disease and Other Terminal-Centered Illnesses, 9 BYU J.
PUB. L. 155, 165 ("The American prison hospital system is collapsing under
the pressure of both expanding prison population and rising health care
costs." (quoting Jonathon Turley, Why Prison Health Care Is a Crime, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 19, 1991, at C19)).
68. Kathleen M. Hawk, Federal Bureau of Prisons (visited Aug. 30, 1996)
<http"/gopher.usdoj.gov/bureaus/bop.html>.
69. Martin, supra note 65, at 6; HAMMETT, supra note 10, at 15 (noting a
64% same-period increase for the general population).
70. See Kantor, AIDS and HIV Infection in Prisoners, in AIDS KNOW-
LEDGE BASE, supra note 1, at 1.8, 1.8-1 (noting higher rate of HIV infection in
state and federal prisons).
71. See David Baltimore, Lessons from People with Nonprogressive HIV
Infection, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 259, 259-60 (1995) (noting that "the absence
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only be warranted if the person is in one of the two final stages
of the disease, late symptomatic or advanced HIV. The late
symptomatic stage of iHIV infection, more commonly referred to
as AIDS, is generally recognized when the CD4 lymphocyte cell
count drops below 200 and other symptoms are present.7 2
"Advanced HIV" is the final stage of AIDS, when CD4 cell
counts have dropped below fifty with accompanying opportun-
istic infections or cancers. 3 During the advanced stage of the
virus, a person is likely to have neurological complications, of-
ten leading to loss of bowel and bladder control, confusion, and
loss of ability to speak.
74
2. BlIV Infection and AIDS in Sentencing
A number of recent cases have examined the relevance of
HIV infection to sentencing. In United States v. Thomas,75 the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the Commission had considered
HIV infection and determined it was not an ordinarily relevant
characteristic for a downward departure. 76 That the Commis-
sion had already considered the physical condition of offenders,
as evidenced by the "extraordinary physical impairment" dis-
tinction in § 5H1.4, served as the primary basis for the court's
conclusion.77
of any apparent progression of disease over a decade or more" following HIV
infection is a "particularly intriguing" characteristic of AIDS).
72. See Paul A. Volberding, Clinical Spectrum of H1V Disease, in AiDS:
ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOsIs, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 123, 126 (Vincent T.
DeVita, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) (explaining that while HIV can infect and
replicate in a wide variety of human cells, researchers have studied and have
best understood HIV infection of lymphocytes expressing the cell surface anti-
gen CD4).
73. Id.
74. See Hardy, supra note 12 (discussing AIDS and advanced HIV).
75. 49 F.3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1995).
76. Id. at 260. The Guideline language of "not ordinarily relevant" is dif-
ferent from the policy statements in the same chapter that specify certain of-
fender characteristics are "not relevant." See U.S.S.G., supra note 7, §§
5H1.10-5H1.12, p.s. (directing that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
socio-economic status, and "lack of guidance as a youth," or similar circum-
stances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing, are all "not relevant" factors
in sentencing). The distinction between "not relevant" and "not ordinarily
relevant" has not been lost on courts seeking to depart from the Guidelines'
ranges. See United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 918-19 (4th Cir. 1990)
(observing, in a case predating § 5H1.12, that although the Guidelines com-
pletely enjoin consideration of certain enumerated factors, a tragic and abu-
sive upbringing may, if extraordinary, permit departure).
77. Thomas, 49 F.3d at 260-61; see supra text accompanying notes 39-40
for description of policy statement.
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In support of this decision, the Thomas court cited United
States v. DePew,78 a 1990 district court decision holding that a
diagnosis of AIDS does not by itself qualify a defendant for an
extraordinary physical impairment departure. 79 In DePew, the
district court stated unequivocally that AIDS was not an ex-
traordinary physical impairment, analogizing AIDS to cancer
and other terminal or life-threatening maladies.8 ° "Except in
extraordinary circumstances not present here," the DePew
court declared, "terminally ill persons who commit serious
crimes may not use their affliction to escape prison."s'
Even in rulings more favorable to HIV-related downward
departures, the level of discourse concerning HIV infection has
been limited and inconclusive.8 2  In United States v. Streat,8 3
78. 751 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-1200 (E.D. Va. 1990), affd on other grounds,
932 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 873 (1991).
79. Id.; United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1995)("Thomas would only be entitled to a departure if his HIV had progressed into
advanced AIDS .... ").
80. DePew, 751 F. Supp. at 1190. The court based its decision, in part, on
the availability of medical facilities in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. De-
Pew, at the time of sentencing, had tested positive for the HIV virus and was
in need of treatment and medication for his condition. Id. at 1200. The court
also relied on caselaw which, as the court found, supported the proposition
that AIDS, without more, like cancer or other life-threatening illnesses, with-
out more, is not a basis for departure, absent some showing of "extraordinary
physical impairment. "Id.
81. Id. at 1199. The court sentenced DePew to 400 months in prison. Id.
at 1200.
82. The desirability of clarity on this issue stems from the Commission's
congressional mandate to review appellate decisions and other apposite ma-
terials in order to ensure that a given topic receives adequate consideration.
See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994) (establishing the purpose of the Commission).
Congress directed that:
The Commission periodically shall review and revise, in consideration
of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promul-
gated pursuant [to its duties] .... The United States Probation Sys-
tem, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the Criminal Division of the United States Department of
Justice, and a representative of the Federal Public Defenders shall
submit to the Commission any observations, comments, or questions
pertinent to the work of the Commission whenever they believe such
communication would be useful ....
28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
Defense attorneys are entitled to understand the potential for success in
pursuing motions to depart downward based on HIV condition. Districtjudges are entitled to act with confidence within the limits of their discretion.
Avoiding adequate discussion on the appellate level may lead to postponed
clarification by the Commission. To leave judges unsure of what they can do
may result in alternate means of departing from the Guideline sentence
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the appellate court directed the district court to evaluate the
offender's physical condition for a possible departure.8 4  The
appellate court extricated itself from the debate, commenting
that whether AIDS "warrants a downward departure need not
be decided today."8 5
In a similar response, the Eighth Circuit noted recently in
United States v. Rabins"6 that "AIDS is a basis for a departure
under [§] 5H1.4" when it has progressed to the stage of
"extraordinary physical impairment.87 The court did not de-
fine when AIDS is at the "extraordinary physical impairment"
stage or provide guidance on how to make this determination.88
H. A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT HIV JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE GUIDELINE, STATUTORY, AND MEDICAL
SUPPORT FOR CONSIDERING AIDS AND ADVANCED HI
DISEASE FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE
The Guidelines, along with medical projections about the
life spans of persons with AIDS, support downward sentencing
departures for an offender with AIDS or advanced HIV. The
physical condition statement of the Guidelines permits depar-
tures for extraordinary physical impairments; 9 AIDS and ad-
vanced IV fit within this language. The mitigating circum-
stance section of the Guidelines permits the court to consider
ranges. See supra note 65 (suggesting that the high number of substantial
assistance departures indicates covert disagreement with the Guidelines).
83. 22 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 112 (I"here is little authority specifically addressing the cir-
cumstances under which AIDS is a proper ground for a downward departure.
Still, sections of the guidelines could justify a downward departure under cer-
tain circumstances.").
85. Id. at 113. While the court of appeals failed to provide any guidance
on the question of AIDS-based departures, the district court found on remand
that the offender's condition met the undefined "extraordinary physical im-
pairment" standard. United States v. Streat, 893 F. Supp. 754, 756-57 (N.D.
Ohio 1995).
86. United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
Johnson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1031 (1996).
87. Id. at 728 (citing United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1275 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 234 (1995)). The court, responding to a district
court clearly equivocating on the issue of HIV departure, merely reiterated
the district court's suggestion that AIDS, depending on its severity, may war-
rant departure.
88. For a detailed dissenting appellate court examination of HIV infec-
tion, terminology, patient classification system, and suggestions for court pol-
icy, see Rabins, 63 F.3d at 732-743 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
89. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, § 5H1.4, p.s.
2471996]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
all relevant factors in sentencing; AIDS and advanced HIV are
relevant to determining the length of an offender's sentence.
90
Moreover, related issues such as the cost of treating HIV-
infected inmates,91 prison population health concerns, 92 and the
courts' roles in reviewing the Guidelines support increased dis-
trict court discretion to consider departures based on AIDS and
advanced HIV.
A. DEPARTURES BASED ON HIV INFECTION: INTER-CIRCUIT
DISPARITIES
1. Rejecting HIV Infection and AIDS as Departure Bases
Two related cases present the primary arguments for re-
jecting HIV infection as a basis for downward departures.
United States v. DePew93 concludes that AIDS is not an ex-
traordinary impairment for departure purposes.94 While the
DePew court's rejection of the departure motion in this case is
appropriate,95 the court's dicta goes too far by grouping AIDS
and other terminal illnesses together and labeling them all as
ineligible factors for downward departures in future cases.96
This blanket conclusion not only disregards prior departure
decisions,97 but also gives short shrift to the Guidelines and
statutory directives allowing courts to consider all relevant of-
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (directing the courts to follow the
Guidelines unless they find an aggravating or mitigating circumstance not
adequately considered in the Guidelines); U.S.S.G., supra note 7, § 5K2.0, p.s.
(noting that unusual or unique circumstances will give rise to additional
grounds for departure).
91. See Stephanie Mencimer, D.C.'s New Death Row;AIDS is Devastating
the District's Prisons and Busting its Budget, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1993, at
C1 (reporting a cost of $60,000 per year in the Washington D.C. correctional
system to care for each inmate with advanced HIV).
92. See supra note 66 (discussing interaction between HIV infection and
tuberculosis).
93. 751 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (E.D. Va. 1990), affd on other grounds, 932
F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 873 (1991).
94. Id. at 1199; see supra text accompanying note 81 (quoting the DePew
court).
95. See DePew, 751 F. Supp. at 1196-97 (noting details of the defendanfs
plan to kidnap, murder, and sexually mutilate a young boy).
96. Id. at 1199.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645, 646 (4th Cir.
1991) (affirming departure where defendant lost lower part of both legs);
United States v. Little, 736 F. Supp. 71, 71 (D.N.J.), affd, 919 F.2d 137 (3d
Cir. 1990) (unpublished table opinion) (affirming departure based on chronic
pulmonary disease).
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fender characteristics in sentencing.98
Additionally, the court's combining of AIDS and the vari-
ous HIV stages with all other life-threatening diseases demon-
strates the court's failure to examine and explore relevant dis-
tinctions for this relatively new disease.99 Unlike cancer and
most other terminal illnesses, HIV infection can spread to
other prison inmates.0 0 Unlike other illnesses in which the in-
fected person is sick with only that illness, having AIDS or ad-
vanced HIV renders a person susceptible to a wide range of
life-threatening diseases. 10' The DePew court's failure to con-
sider these distinctions constitutes an abdication from the im-
portant judicial function of providing direction and shape to
the Guidelines, a function the Commission specifically re-
quested.102
In the second related case, the court in United States v.
ThomasI03 supported the conclusions of the DePew court while
engaging in its own analysis of the issue. In refusing to depart
downward, the Thomas court held that the lIV-infected of-
fender "would only be entitled to a departure if his HIV had
progressed into advanced AIDS, and then only if his health
was.., an 'extraordinary physical impairment.'"'1°  The court
98. The tension between more narrow sentencing ranges and the impor-
tance to the offender of contextualized sentences has led to conflict between
the statutory language, the Guidelines, and their application to departures.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1994) ("No limitation shall be placed on the infor-
mation concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person con-
victed of an offense which a court... may receive and consider for the pur-
pose of imposing an appropriate sentence.") and United States v. Milikowsky,
65 F.3d 4, 6-8 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming departure where imprisonment would
impose an extraordinary hardship on offender's employees) with U.S.S.G., su-
pra note 7, § 5H1.6, p.s. (stating that family responsibilities and community
ties are not ordinarily relevant in departure consideration). Resolving this
tension completely is difficult; Congress clearly intended the Commission to
reduce the number of sentencing disparities, but Congress also wanted to pre-
serve the court's discretion to consider all factors.
99. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the unique
characteristics of the AIDS virus).
100. HIV is currently spread in three principle ways: unprotected sex,
sharing of needles from intravenous drug use, and by birth from mother to
child. Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 2, at 24-28.
101. See, e.g., id., at 35 (discussing extreme vulnerability of HIV-positive
people to tuberculosis).
102. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, PtA, § 4(b), p.s. (discussing the hope for
an evolving sentencing guideline system based on continuing study of court
sentencing practices).
103. 49 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 1995).
104. Id. at 261.
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questionably asserted that the offender would be "entitled" to a
downward departure if his condition were an extraordinary
physical impairment."5 The Thomas court failed to recognize,
however, that a district court's departure decision is a discre-
tionary one that is also based on the seriousness of the crime
and the need to punish the offender." 6 In addition, the Tho-
mas court made an unsupported assumption that because the
Commission considered whether an offender's physical condi-
tion should be a factor in sentencing, it had considered possible
HIV infection.'0 7
DePew and Thomas reflect the hurried analyses in which
courts have engaged for HIV infection in sentencing. Because
of the limited number of cases reaching the appellate level,
subsequent courts have incorporated the holdings and dicta of
DePew or Thomas in every recent case dealing with HIV and
downward departures.' °8 The use of these two cases as author-
ity has led to a multiplier effect of decisions based on awkward
holdings, further complicating future decisions of district
courts considering HIV-related departures.
2. Qualified Consideration of HIV and AIDS as a Basis for
Downward Departures
Even when appellate courts remand to the district courts
to determine the propriety of downward departures for HIV-
105. Id.
106. See supra note 43 (discussing two-step process for departure consid-
eration).
107. Thomas, 49 F.3d at 260.
108. A "multiplier effect" is evident in a string of cases emanating from the
DePew holding in that every subsequent case relies on the DePew court as its
basis. The Seventh Circuit, however, recently used the Thomas decision, and
its reliance on DePew, to reach a slightly different result. United States v.
Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1275 (7th Cir. 1995). The Woody court held: "An AIDS-
afflicted individual is entitled to a downward departure under § 5H1.4 only
when the disease has progressed to such an advanced state that it could be
characterized as an "extraordinary physical impairment." Id. The courts
have thus made explicit the position implicit in the original case. The DePew
court ruled that AIDS is not per se an extraordinary physical impairment.
751 F. Supp. at 1199. Thomas agreed with DePew but acknowledged
"advanced AIDS" and poor health that was an "extraordinary physical im-
pairment" would qualify for departure. Thomas, 49 F.3d at 261. Woody bor-
rowed from both DePew and Thomas and reached the least qualified conclu-
sion: an HIV positive condition properly documented is grounds for downward
departure. Woody, 55 F.3d at 1275.
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infected offenders, the appellate courts often fail to provide di-
rection. One appellate court chose to provide evidence for both
sides of the departure debate, citing to DePew as a restriction
against departure, while noting numerous examples of less se-
rious illnesses that warranted departure. 10 9 It remanded the
departure decision to the district court, refusing to comment on
the proper use of AIDS or advanced HIV as a reason for down-
ward departures."'
While such a directive may appear open-ended and flexi-
ble, it actually limits the consideration and application of HIV
departures. By failing to define if and when HJV infection and
AIDS become "extraordinary physical impairments," an appel-
late court leaves a district court to examine HIV infection and
interpret the nature of the resulting impairment. 11 Some dis-
trict courts have been reluctant to perform this task."2 More-
over, by refusing to discuss HIV infection and AIDS, appellate
courts fail to acknowledge that the Commission may not have
adequately considered HIV infection and AIDS during the de-
velopment of the Guidelines." 3 Because failure to consider a
factor adequately is a basis for a possible mitigating circum-
stance departure, this omission by appellate courts is problem-
atic.'1 4
The result in United States v. Rabins15 produced a differ-
ent uncertainty for the sentencing court. After an Iowa district
court explicitly requested clarification about whether the
Guidelines allow departure for HIV infection, the Eighth Cir-
109. United States v. Streat, 22 F.3d 109, 112 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
110. Id. at 113.
111. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Streat
court's relinquishment of the issue of AIDS and downward departure to the
lower court's discretion).
112. See United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 733 (8th Cir. 1995) (Wilson,
J., dissenting) ("Judge Longstaff stated that he would 'be delighted to have
some more specific guidance from the Eighth Circuit' on this issue.. . ."), cert.
denied, Johnson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1031 (1996).
113. The total number of AIDS cases reported during the formation of the
Guidelines, while significant, pales in comparison to current cumulative to-
tals. Of the 501,310 cases of AIDS reported in the United States and its terri-
tories by October 31, 1995, 62% had died. MORBmDrIY & MORTALITy WKLY.
REP., supra note 9, at 849.
114. See U.S.S.G., supra note 7, § 5K2.0, p.s. (discussing the power of
courts to impose sentences outside the range established by the Commission);
supra note 109 (noting the request for guidance on the issue of HIV and
downward departures).
115. 63 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 1995).
1996]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cult Court of Appeals responded by reiterating that AIDS is a
basis for downward departure when it reaches the extraordi-
nary physical impairment stage. 16 The appellate court af-
firmed the lower court's rejection of the departure request
without further examination, however, despite the lower
court's uncertainty over whether it had the authority to de-
part. " ' The district court's confusion and the failure of the ap-
pellate court to confront the confusion directly reflect the lack
of consensus surrounding HIV-related departures, as well as
the inconclusive interpretation of "extraordinary impairment."" 8
116. Id. at 728.
117. Id. ("We will not disturb the Courts conclusion unless it is clearly er-
roneous.") (citation omitted).
118. Traditional canons of interpretation direct a court to interpret a legis-
lative directive by its ordinary meaning where the text of a statute is clear
and there are not conflicting or outrageous results. See United States v. Al-
varez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599, 1603 (1994) ("When interpreting a statute, we
look first and foremost to its text.") (citing Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain,
112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)); FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001 (1994) ("In
the absence of... a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance
with its ordinary or natural meaning.") (citing Smith v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2050, 2054 (1993)).
When the text leads to conflicts, courts can turn to the lesser canons, in-
cluding legislative history, legislative intent, and reasonableness. See Green
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1989) ("Concluding that the
text is ambiguous... we then seek guidance from legislative history and from
the Rules' overall structure."); see also Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650(1974) ("When 'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a par-
ticular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection
with it the whole statute.., and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated
by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into
execution the will of the legislature ..... ") (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1857)). The former method encourages "bright lines"
such as the DePew court made. United States v. DePew, 751 F. Supp. 1195,
1199 (E.D. Va. 1990), af/d on other grounds, 932 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 502 U.S. 873 (1991). The latter method permits a broader application of
discretion and is better suited to the still evolving case law surrounding HIV
infection in sentencing. See United States v. Schein, 31 F.3d 135, 138 (3d Cir.
1994) (noting downward departure may be appropriate for an HIV-infected
offender, but remanding for further findings on the physical condition of the
particular offender); United States v. Streat, 22 F.3d 109, 112 (6th Cir. 1994)(per curiam) (authorizing the district court to use discretion in determining
whether HIV or AIDS warrants a downward departure).
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B. SECTION 5H1.4 AND "EXTRAORDINARY PHYSICAL
IMPAIRMENT": THE RELEVANCE OF AIDS AND
ADVANCED HIV CONDITION TO DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES
Courts should consider departing below the Guidelines
range for an offender with AIDS or an advanced HIV designa-
tion because the advanced stages of HIV will produce an
"extraordinary physical impairment." Both the late sympto-
matic stage and the advanced stage of HIV involve physical
debilitation sufficient to qualify as "extraordinary physical im-
pairment."119 Both of these HIV stages significantly impair an
affected person's health, are precursors to certain death, and
are recognized by a widely accepted classification system-the
CD4 count in combination with particular symptoms.120 Thus,
defining what constitutes extraordinary physical impairment
at the latter two stages of HIV is a workable standard for lower
courts to follow.
1. Extraordinary Impairment of AIDS and Advanced HIV
Offenders
The characteristics of an offender with AIDS or advanced
HIV are as serious or more serious than other impairments
which courts have recognized as warranting downward depar-
tures. The late symptomatic stage is consistent with progres-
sive HIV infection, a worsening condition, and an approximate
survival time often years.'2 ' The final stage of AIDS, advanced
HIV, 12 leaves an offender exceptionally susceptible to oppor-
119. See supra note 2 (discussing HIV classification system and the cur-
rent debate over terminology and disease stages).
120. See supra note 2 (describing the Center for Disease Control's BIV
classification system).
121. A recent supplement of AIDS AND THE LAW cautions on this point, re-
porting:
Currently, the average time period from infection with HIV to death
is estimated to be 10 years. Most persons with HIV show at least
some clinical or laboratory evidence of immunodeficiency within that
time period. Generalizations on this point can be meaningless when
applied to individual cases, however, given that many persons are
long-term survivors who have lived with HIV infection for well over a
decade without any evidence of immunodeficiency.
DAVID W. WEBBER, AIDS AND THE LAW 4 (2d ed. Supp. 2 1995).
122. See Volberding, supra note 72, at 133 (describing the advanced H1V
designation as "used for those patients with an increasingly significant risk of
mortality, which separate studies have seen when CD4+ cell counts drop be-
low 50 cells per millimetr cubed."); see also Hardy, supra note 12 (noting that
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tunistic infections such as Kaposi's sarcoma, HIV-related de-
mentia, and tuberculosis.'23 This progressive physical debili-
tation'24 is more likely to occur in a prison system increasingly
challenged to provide adequate health care to its inmates.125
AIDS and advanced HIV most closely resemble a progress-
ing cancer that may subside at times, yet remains terminal
and unstoppable. Like the metastasized cancer some courts
have regarded as an extraordinary physical impairment, 126 ad-
vanced HIV is debilitating, requires significant medical atten-
tion, and inevitably leads to death. Without the option to
downward depart in appropriate cases, the Guidelines' sen-
tence range can mandate terms of imprisonment equivalent to
"death sentences" and treat offenders with AIDS and advanced
HIV differently than offenders with other maladies. 127
2. Guideline Support for AIDS and Advanced HIV Offenders
as Seriously Infirm
The physical condition statement of the Guidelines pro-
vides that an extraordinary impairment departure may be
considered for a "seriously infirm defendant" for whom home
detention is more appropriate because of cost and efficiency
concerns.1 28 AIDS and advanced HIV can reduce an offender to
such a seriously infirm state that imprisonment becomes too
when the cell count falls below 50, "the trouble really starts. This is the major
alarm point, by which time an HIV-positive person must begin taking prophy-
lactic treatments with a number of antiviral and antibiotic drugs to prevent
the almost certain development of a host of opportunistic diseases.").
123. Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 2, at 36-38. Kaposi's sarcoma is
a blood vessel tumor, while HIV-related dementia resembles Alzheimer's dis-
ease in its ruthlessness.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 121-123 (explaining the character-
istics of persons with deteriorating AIDS and advanced HIV).
125. See generally Scott Burris, Prisons, Law and Public Health: The Case
for a Coordinated Response to Epidemic Disease Behind Bars, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 291, 299-301 (discussing increasing pressures on prison medical systems
because of the confluence of HIV infection and newer strains of tuberculosis).
126. See United States v. Velasquez, 762 F. Supp. 39, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
127. Of course, an ill offender can be sentenced to such a "death sentence"
even with the use of a downward departure. The opportunity to depart, how-
ever, is the option this Note suggests is best left to the sentencing court.
128. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (providing description
of policy statement). A potential implication of a court basing its sentencing
on cost and efficiency concerns is to limit departure power to medical cases in
which treatment is extremely costly. Drawing this line is dangerous, as it
neglects the other purposes of sentencing Congress directed the courts to
consider. See supra note 24 (listing the four purposes of sentencing found in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)).
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costly and inefficient to be a viable option.129 While the Bureau
of Prisons has a federal medical center for inmates, the high
cost of caring for a prisoner in the advanced stages of HIV in-
fection 130 and the questionable efficiency of caring for dying
inmates warrant the courts' attention to alternatives to full-
term sentencing.
The Federal Bureau of Prison's ability to accommodate a
prospective inmate has been used as one factor in determining
whether an offender has an extraordinary physical impairment
warranting downward departure.' 31 In United States v. Fish-
er, 3 1 for example, the appellate court remanded a case to the
district court for proper consideration of the costs of imprison-
ing a paralyzed offender when determining whether the defen-
dant's disabilities constituted an extraordinary physical im-
pairment.133 The cost of imprisoning offenders with AIDS and
advanced HIV is significantly higher than imprisoning a
paralyzed offender, by even conservative estimates, because of
the expensive drug therapy many of these inmates require.
34
Consistency in sentencing practice dictates that courts be af-
forded the opportunity to consider sentence departures or
modified sentencing for AIDS and advanced HIV offenders. 135
129. See supra note 15 (discussing the congressional motivation for sen-
tence reform).
130. See Polonsky, supra note 67, at 621 (noting cost to care for advanced
HIV-infected prisoner in D.C. corrections system).
131. United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir.
1993). The court noted, "the proper inquiry under section 5H1.4 calls for a
comparison between the efficiency and cost of a full term of incarceration, as
opposed to a lesser or alternative sentence, in achieving deterrence, incapaci-
tation, just punishment, and rehabilitation." Id. at 621-22 (Ferguson, J., con-
curring). The Fourth Circuit has upheld a departure from incarceration so
that the offender could continue to receive specialized medical treatment.
United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645, 646 (4th Cir. 1991). The extraor-
dinary impairment in this case was the offender's loss of both legs below the
knee in the Korean War. Id. The appellate court emphasized that, "[c]on-
sideration of such an extraordinary medical problem in deciding to impose a
sentence other than imprisonment is specifically authorized by the Guide-
lines." Id.
132. 55 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 1995).
133. Id. at 485; see also Polonsky, supra note 67, at 621 (discussing cost of
caring for HIV-infected inmates in the District of Columbia).
134. See Lundstrom, supra note 67, at 178 (noting estimates of the cost of
caring for prison inmates with AIDS and advanced lIV).
135. Certainly cases exist in which downward departures would be com-
pletely inappropriate no matter how extensive an offender's HIV impairment
was. While the court in DePew can be criticized for its blanket assertion that
AIDS is not ever an extraordinary physical impairment, the decision to not
1996]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
3. Drawing an Appropriate Line for HIV-Related Departures
Because the time between initial HIV infection, deteriora-
tion, AIDS designation, and advanced HIV can vary signifi-
cantly, mere HIV infection without physical deterioration
should not be a basis for downward departure. HIV infection
alone, or even low cell counts alone, do not mean debilitation is
imminent. 136 To the contrary, about five percent of HIV in-
fected persons have a nonprogressive strain of HIV that allows
them to remain healthy for significant periods of time. 3 7 Peo-
ple with these nonprogressive infections have been infected for
up to fifteen years, yet have retained healthy immune re-
sponses to their infections. 38
Regarding infection alone as an extraordinary physical
impairment means an HIV-infected offender could receive an
abbreviated sentence, serve the sentence, and exit the correc-
tional facility still in relatively good health. This would defeat
the purpose of the departure: to alleviate extraordinary hard-
ship on the offender as well as on the Bureau of Prisons. The
widespread use of departures for HIV-infected offenders with-
out manifestations of a more advanced phase of the disease
could conceivably create a separate sentencing standard for in-
fected offenders, leading to a subversion of Congress's goal of
uniformity in sentencing.'39
depart would have been appropriate even if the court believed it had the dis-
cretion to depart. The court convicted the offender in DePew of conspiring to
kidnap and sexually torture a young boy with the hope of video recording and
marketing the acts. United States v. DePew, 751 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (E.D.
Va. 1990), affd on other grounds, 932 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 873 (1991). Providing clear directives to a court that confirms its discre-
tion to examine HIV infection is distinct from any suggestion that a court
must depart for a particular circumstance. The district court remains firmly
in control of applying its discretion to the physical impairment, the crime
committed, and the danger of the offender.
136. Interview with James Rothenberger, M.P.H., University of Minnesota
School of Public Health, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 20, 1995).
137. See Baltimore, supra note 71, at 259-60 (discussing ability of a subset
of the population to resist development of AIDS after infection with HIV).
138. Id.; see also Susan P. Buchbinder et al., Long-term HIV-1 Infection
Without Immunologic Progression, 8 AIDS 1123, 1123-28 (1994) (reporting re-
sults of a study examining a subgroup of men infected with HIV for 10-15
years without progression of the disease).
139. See supra note 15 (discussing original purposes behind Guidelines).
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C. THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE DEPARTURE: SUPPORT FOR
COURTS' DISCRETION TO DEPART IN CASES OF AIDS AND
ADVANCED HIV
Courts have discretion under policy statement 5K2.0 to
depart from the sentence range if they find that the nature of
the crime or offender constitutes a mitigating circumstance
that the Commission did not adequately consider in formulat-
ing the Guidelines.14 While the Guidelines do account for
physical condition generally, the recent time period in which
HIV infection developed, the nature of the disease, and its dif-
ferences from other illnesses the Commission probably exam-
ined, suggest it is unlikely the Commission "adequately consid-
ered" HIV infection. Accordingly, a district court that
addresses the Commission's silence on HIV infection and con-
siders the purposes of sentencing may choose to downward de-
part based on AIDS or advanced HIV.
1. The Inadequacy of the Commission's Consideration of HIV
Infection
While courts have reached different conclusions as to
whether the Commission considered HIV infection when it de-
liberated offender characteristics in setting the Guidelines'
ranges,141 no evidence exists suggesting that the Commission
did; certainly no evidence exists as to whether the Commission
considered HIV status "adequately."142
To consider adequately HIV infection, the Commission
would have needed to consider thoroughly HIV during the de-
140. U.S.S.G., supra note 7, § 5K2.0, p.s. For a recent overview of the de-
bate regarding "adequate consideration" and what is an atypical case, see
United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436, 438-42 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
141 See United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 260 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The
key issue is whether the Sentencing Commission adequately considered the
impact, proportionately speaking, of the sentencing guidelines on persons who
are HIV positive .... [T]he guidelines did consider whether the physical con-
dition of a defendant should be a factor in sentencing... ."); United States v.
Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 735 (8th Cir. 1995) (Wilson, J., dissenting) ("It is beyond
dispute that the Commission has not taken into consideration the issue of
HIV.... ."), cert. denied, Johnson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1031 (1996).
142. The federal statute provides, "In determining whether a circumstance
was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sen-
tencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The Second Circuit has fit-
tingly noted, "Extraordinary circumstances... are by their nature not capa-
ble of adequate consideration. They therefore may constitute proper grounds
for departure." United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1992).
1996] 257
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
velopment of the Guidelines. With the crisis period of HIV just
having emerged in the mid-1980s, it is unlikely that HIV-
related cases would have worked their way through the appel-
late system in a manner that would have produced significant
statistics for the Commission to consider.'
43
Even if the Commission had been aware of this disease
making its way through certain populations, the Commission
probably did not foresee the widespread emergence of the dis-
ease among convicted offenders." Further, the wildly varied
stages of this disease do not support interpreting the Commis-
sion's silence as a recommendation that HIV infection is al-
ways ordinary and of no particular relevance. A court's con-
clusion that the Commission "adequately considered" HIV
infection is therefore unsupported by the available evidence.
2. Appellate Findings of Mitigating Circumstances
The same rationale that appellate courts have used to jus-
tify mitigating circumstances for other diseases can potentially
apply to AIDS and advanced HIV infection. Like a cancer in
its advanced stages,'45 a medical diagnosis of AIDS with a de-
teriorating physical condition is life threatening. Both condi-
tions can be such a guarantee of physical and mental debilita-
tion as to warrant the consideration of downward departure.
Admitting such conditions as atypical cases need not destroy
the "heartland" of cases that the relevant guideline range rep-
resents. To the contrary, it is in keeping with the statutory di-
rective to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with" the purposes of sentencing. 46
143. Some of the earliest federal cases mentioning HIV infection or AIDS
are from 1985. See, e.g., Georgia v. Fleck & Assocs., 622 F. Supp. 256, 257
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (dealing with State's attempt to close gay club); Baker v.
Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526, 528 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (discussing AIDS in reference to
suit challenging state ban on consensual sodomy between homosexuals).
144. See First 500,00 Cases, supra note 9, at 851 (noting that 50,000 ALDS
cases in the United States were reported from 1981 to 1987, while more than
245,000 were reported from 1993 to October 1995).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61 (discussing United States v.
Velasquez, 762 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) and United States v. Basey, No.
95-1348, 1995 WL 567356 (8th Cir. Sept. 12, 1995)).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994); see also supra note 24 (noting the four
purposes of sentencing, found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A-D), that courts
should consider in determining the sufficiency of a sentence); United States v.
Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1993) (arguing relevant goal in
sentencing offender is not to sentence to a full guideline range sentence, but
to follow the statute, which sets forth "deterrence, incapacitation, just pun-
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III. THE COURTS AND THE COMMISSION: A PROPOSAL
FOR PARTNERSHIP IN GUIDELINE ADMINISTRATION
A. RESPONDING FULLY TO DEPARTURE MOTIONS BASED ON
HIV INFECTION: THE ROLE OF THE DISTRICT AND
APPELLATE COURTS
The courts' assessments of the extent to which the Com-
mission considered unlisted offender characteristics are an in-
tegral part of the continued development of the Guidelines. 4 7
The complexity of a new sentencing system and the importance
of understanding the practical effects of the Commission's ef-
fort require active feedback not only from academics, but also
from courts influenced by the Guidelines. To resolve whether
the acceptance of AIDS or advanced HIV is an extraordinary
physical impairment or a mitigating circumstance that creates
an open-ended rationale for departures, the district and appel-
late courts must increase discussion about the disease. District
courts that apply Guideline sections 5H1.4 and 5K2.0 and dis-
cuss HIV infection as a basis for downward departures provide
the foundation for a more definite confirmation or rejection of
the practice by appellate courts.
Appellate courts, although limited in their scope of review,
should emphasize that HIV infection at the stage of AIDS and
advanced HIV can qualify as an extraordinary physical im-
pairment and that district courts can consider them as bases
for downward departures. This reserves, though does not
mandate, the power of district courts to depart from the
Guideline range if appropriate. Presently, the reluctance to
speak clearly on the HIV departure issue148 raised in the lower
courts preserves the discretion of the district courts to make
inquiries as thorough or as limited as they believe warranted.
This complete deference to the district courts' discretion leads
to potential differences in sentences for similarly situated of-
fenders. By recognizing that HIV infection in its advanced
stages is an extraordinary physical impairment, or that the
Commission did not consider it in developing the Guidelines,
ishment, and rehabilitation" as goals) (citation omitted).
147. See U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, Pt.A, § 4(b), p.s. (discussing the
Commission's intention that courts consider unlisted factors where relevant in
unusual cases and noting the sentencing guideline refinement that will occur
with monitoring of the uses of such factors).
148. See text accompanying notes 111-118 (discussing courts' commentary
on the HIV departure issue).
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the appellate courts will produce a clearer rule for the lower
courts and a clearer issue for the Commission to consider. 149
B. PROVIDING RESPONSIVE DIRECTION: THE ROLE OF THE
COMMISSION
The Commission is ultimately responsible for the success-
ful application of the Guidelines.15° The Commission recog-
nizes that the regular review mandated by Congress 151 is inte-
gral to the evolutionary process of the Guidelines. 152 While
courts originally had hoped that the Commission's revisions
would reflect the nuances of their sentencing practices, 153 the
Commission's response has been limited at best and hostile in
some cases.'54 The future of the Guidelines in those circuits
149. See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 946-49 (1st Cir. 1993)(summarizing the statutory and guideline support for a sentencing court's de-
parture decision). The Rivera court's excellent review notes:
[T]he very theory of the Guidelines system is that when courts,
drawing upon experience and informed judgment in such cases, de-
cide to depart, they will explain their departures. The courts of ap-
peals, and the Sentencing Commission, will examine, and learn from,
those reasons. And, the resulting knowledge will help the Commis-
sion to change, to refine, and to improve, the Guidelines themselves.
That is the theory of partnership that the Guidelines embody.
Id. at 949-50.
150. See supra note 16 (noting the prominent role of the Commission in the
creation of the Guidelines).
151. See supra note 82 (providing statutory language that requires updates
in the Guidelines).
152. The Commission explained the limited number of offender character-
istics it commented on, writing:
The Commission is a permanent body, empowered by law to write
and rewrite guidelines, with progressive changes, over many years.
By monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyz-
ing their stated reasons for doing so and court decisions with refer-
ences thereto, the Commission, over time, will be able to refine the
guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and
should not be permitted.
U.S.S.G., supra note 7, Ch.1, Pt.A, § 4(b), p.s.; see also U.S.S.G., supra note 7,
App. C. (listing 1988-1993 amendments).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1122-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The Commission has announced that it will revise the
Guidelines in the future based upon its study of departures .... To guide fu-
ture revision of the Guidelines, sentencing judges have an obligation to create
a record for the Commission showing where departure has been found appro-
priate.").
154. See supra note 49 (discussing the departure in United States v. Lara,
905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990), that the Commission responded to by barring the
future consideration of "physique" as ordinarily relevant).
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where sentence range evasion is widespread'55 is dependent
upon the Commission regaining the authority to establish
binding sentence ranges. Clarifying the status of HIV infection
in the consideration of sentence departure is one way to rein-
force the uniformity the Guidelines claim to represent."6
The Commission should therefore amend the physical
conditions statement to present AIDS and advanced HIV in-
fection as additional examples of an extraordinary physical
impairment that could be grounds for downward sentencing
departures. The current disagreement among circuits, 157 as
well as the reluctance of some appellate courts to provide clear
guidance on the issue of HIV infection,158 is a clarion call for
the Commission to continue the evolution of the Guidelines
that began a decade ago. Only by the Commission's issuance of
evidence of review can a lower court confidently conclude the
Commission "adequately considered" BIV infection. Anything
short of clarification will not curtail disparate sentences for
similarly situated offenders. Such inter-circuit disparity is
what the Sentencing Reform Act sought to minimize. 59
CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Guidelines, while addressing many of
the issues surrounding disparities in sentencing, have not re-
sulted in the uniform application of downward departures for
155. Approximately 30% of sentenced cases in each of the First, Third,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits result in a downward departure. COMMN REP.,
supra note 15, at 83-85.
156. One commentator provided an answer to the argument that the
Commission cannot micro-manage administration of the Guidelines:
If the Senate Judiciary Committee, with a host of legislative topics on
its agenda, could provide a volume of well-considered reasons to ex-
plain its guidance to the Commission, surely the Commission,
charged with the duty to "establish sentencing policies and practices
for the federal justice system that ... reflect, to the extent practica-
ble, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the
criminal justice process," could do at least as well in its guidance.
Freed, supra note 18, at 1736.
157. See supra notes 5, 11, 12 (describing various conclusions of circuit
courts on the issue of HIV and departures). See generally Stacey M. Stud-
nicki, Individualized Sentencing: Federal Sentencing Departures Based Upon
Physical Condition, 1994 DET. C.L. REv. 1215, 1224 ("[T]he Second and
Eighth Circuits have issued a majority of the decisions granting or upholding
departures based upon physical condition.") (footnote omitted).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 109-118 (discussing limited review
by some appellate courts).
159. See supra note 15 (noting the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act).
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offenders with AIDS or advanced HIV. Significantly, federal
appellate courts have interpreted the Commission's downward
departure policy differently, or avoided conclusive rulings alto-
gether. The result is a patchwork of interpretations subverting
the goal of consistency in sentencing policy and barely examin-
ing HIV infection and AIDS. To resolve this ambiguity and
lack of direction, the Sentencing Commission should amend the
Guidelines to clarify that AIDS accompanied by physical dete-
rioration and advanced HIV is an "extraordinary physical im-
pairment" warranting consideration for downward sentencing
departure.
